This paper presents secrecy analyses of a full-duplex MIMOME network which consists of two full-duplex multiantenna users (Alice and Bob) and an arbitrarily located multiantenna eavesdropper (Eve). The paper assumes that Eve's channel state information (CSI) is completely unknown to Alice and Bob except for a small radius of secured zone. The first part of this paper aims to optimize the powers of jamming noises from both users. To handle Eve's CSI being unknown to users, the focus is placed on Eve at the most harmful location, and the large matrix theory is applied to yield a hardened secrecy rate to work on. The performance gain of the power optimization in terms of maximum tolerable number of antennas on Eve is shown to be significant. The second part of this paper shows two analyses of anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE) that can better handle Eve with any number of antennas. One analysis assumes that Eve has a prior statistical knowledge of its CSI, which yields lower and upper bounds on secure degrees of freedom of the system as functions of the number (N) of antennas on Eve and the size (K) of information packet. The second analysis assumes that Eve does not have any prior knowledge of its CSI but performs blind detection of information, which yields an approximate secrecy rate for the case of K being larger than N.
I. INTRODUCTION
S ECURITY of wireless networks is of paramount importance in today's world as billions of people around the globe are dependent upon these networks for a myriad of activities for their businesses and lives. Among several key issues in wireless security [1] , confidentiality is of particular interest to many researchers in recent years and is a focus of this paper. For convenience, we will refer to confidentiality as security and vice versa.
The traditional way to keep information confidential from unauthorized persons and/or devices is via cryptography at upper layers of the network, which include the asymmetrickey method (involving a pair of public key and private key) Manuscript and the symmetric-key method (involving a secret key shared between two legitimate users). As the computing capabilities of modern computers (including quantum computers) rapidly improve, the asymmetric-key method is increasingly vulnerable as this method relies on computational complexity for security. In fact, the symmetric-key method is gaining more attraction in applications [2] . However, the establishment of a secret key (or any secret) shared between two users is not trivial in itself. Even if a secret key was pre-installed in a pair of legitimate devices (during manufacturing or otherwise), the lifetime of the secret key in general shortens each time the secret key is used for encryption. For many applications such as big data streaming, such secret key must be periodically renewed or changed. To enjoy the convenience of mobility, it is highly desirable for users to be able to establish a secret key in a wireless fashion.
Establishing a secret key or directly transmitting secret information between users in a wireless fashion (without a preexisting shared secret) is the essence of physical layer security [3] . There are two complementary approaches in physical layer security: secret-key generation and secret information transmission. The former requires users to use their (correlated) observations and an unlimited public channel to establish a secret key, and the latter requires one user to transmit secret information directly to the other. This paper is concerned with the latter, i.e., transmission of secret information (such as secret key) between users without any prior digital secret.
Specifically, this paper is focused on a network as illustrated in Fig. 1 where one legitimate user (Alice) wants to send a secret key to another legitimate user (Bob) subject to eavesdropping by an eavesdropper (Eve) anywhere. Each of the two users/devices is allowed to have multiple antennas, and both Alice and Bob are capable of full-duplex operations. Following a similar naming in the literature such as [4] , we call the above setup a full-duplex MIMOME network where MIMOME refers to the multi-input multi-output (MIMO) channel between Alice and Bob and the multi-antenna Eve.
The MIMOME related works in the literature include: [4] - [15] where the channel state information (CSI) at Eve is assumed to be known not only to Eve itself 1 but also to Alice and Bob; [16] - [19] where a partial knowledge of Eve's CSI is assumed to be available to Alice and Bob and an averaged secrecy or secrecy outage was considered; [13] , [16] , [20] - [24] where artificial noise is embedded in the signal from Alice; and [25] - [30] where Bob is treated as a full-duplex node capable to receive the signal from Alice while transmitting jamming noise.
From the literature, the idea of using jamming noise from Alice or Bob appears important. Inspired by that, this paper will first consider a case where both Alice and Bob send jamming noises while Alice transmits secret information to Bob. We will explore how to optimize the jamming powers from Alice and Bob. In [26] , jamming from both users was also considered. But here for power optimization we include the effect of the residual self-interference of full-duplex radio. There are other differences in the problem formulation and objectives. We assume that Eve's CSI is completely unknown to Alice or Bob except for a radius of secured zone free of Eve around Alice. A similar idea was also applied in [31] but in a different problem setting. We will focus on Eve that is located at the most harmful position. Furthermore, to handle the small-scale fading at Eve, we apply the large matrix theory to obtain a closed-form expression of a secrecy rate, which makes the power optimization tractable. Unlike [24] where large matrix theory was also applied, we consider an arbitrary large-scale-fading at Eve among other major differences. With the optimized powers, we reveal a significant performance gain in terms of the maximum tolerable number of antennas on Eve to maintain a positive secrecy. We will also show that as the number of antennas on Eve increases, the impact of the jamming noise from either Alice or Bob on secrecy vanishes. This contribution extends a previous understanding of single-antenna users shown in [30] .
Later in this paper, we will analyze a two-phase scheme for secret information transmission proposed in [30] . In the first phase, an anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE) method is applied which allows users to find their CSI but suppresses Eve's ability to obtain its CSI. In the second phase, secret information is transmitted between Alice and Bob while Eve has little or no knowledge of its CSI. We show two analyses based on two different assumptions. The first analysis assumes that Eve has a prior statistical knowledge of its CSI. With every node knowing a statistical model of CSI anywhere, we use mutual information to analyze the secret rate of the network, from which lower and upper bounds on the secure degrees of freedom are derived. These bounds are simple functions of the number of antennas on Eve. The second analysis assumes that Eve does not have any prior knowledge of its CSI. Due to ANECE in phase 1, Eve is blind to its CSI. But in phase 2, Eve performs blind detection of the information from Alice. We analyze the performance of the 1 All entities are treated as "gender neutral". blind detection, from which an approximate secret rate is derived and numerically illustrated. Both of these analyses are important contributions useful for a better understanding of ANECE.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by upper and lowercase boldface letters. The trace, Hermitian transpose, column-wise vectorization, (i, j)th element, and complex conjugate of a matrix A are denoted by Tr(A), A H , vec(A), A i,j , and A * , respectively. For a matrix X and its vectorized version x, ivec(x) is the inverse operation of x = vec(X). A diagonal matrix with elements of x on its diagonal is diag(x T ). Expectation with respect to a random variable x is denoted by E x [·]. Let the random variables X n and X be defined on the same probability space, and we write X n a.s. → X if X n converges to X almost surely as n → ∞. The identity matrix of the size n × n is I n (or I with n implied in the context), and 1 n is a row vector of length n of all ones. A circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable x with variance σ 2 is denoted as x ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ). The mutual information between random variables x and y is I(x; y), and h(x) denotes the differential entropy of x. Logarithm in base 2 is denoted by log(·), and (·) + max(0, ·).
II. OPTIMIZATION OF JAMMING POWERS AND EFFECTS OF EVE'S ANTENNAS

A. System Model
Our network setup is shown in Fig. 1 , where Alice (with N A antennas) intends to send secret information over a wireless channel to Bob (with N B antennas) in the presence of possibly many passive Eves (of N E antennas each) that may collude with each other at the network layer but not at the physical layer. We will focus on the most harmful Eve. Physical layer colluding among distributed Eves to form a large virtual antenna array is highly difficult in practice. But if a virtual antenna array from colluding Eves is likely in some applications, we could treat these colluding Eves as a single mega Eve with a large number of antennas.
The system parameters are normalized in a similar way as in [28] . In particular, the large-scale-fading factor from Alice to Eve is modeled as (when a model is needed
where α is the path-loss exponent. We assume that no Eve is closer to Alice than a radius Δ, i.e., d A ≥ Δ. The normalized large-scale-fading factor of the residual self-interference at both Alice and Bob is denoted by ρ. (In all simulations, ρ is considered to be 0.1%.) The small-scale-fading channel matrix from Alice to Eve is denoted by A, that from Bob to Eve is B, and that of the residual self-interference at Bob and Alice are G and K, respectively. 2 The channel matrix from Alice to Bob is denoted by H, and its SVD is denoted by
where U and V are unitary matrices, and Σ is the N B × N A diagonal matrix that contains the singular values of H (i.e., σ i , i = 1, . . . , N B ) in descending order assuming N A ≥ N B .
All the elements in all channel matrices are modeled as i.i.d. circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. In this section, we assume that Alice and Bob have the knowledge of H but not of A and B, and Eve has the knowledge of all these matrices.
Alice sends the following signal containing r ≤ N B ≤ N A streams of secret information mixed with artificial noise:
where k is the index of time slot, V 1 is the first r columns of V, V 2 is the last N A − r columns of V, s(k) is Alice's information vector with the covariance matrix Q r and Tr(Q r ) = P s , and w A (k) is an (N A − r) × 1 artificial noise vector with distribution CN (0, P n N A −r I). Here, P s + P n = P A ≤ P max A . While Bob receives information from Alice, it also sends a jamming noise:
where w B (k) is an N B × 1 artificial noise vector with distribution CN (0, P B N B I). Note that both P A and P B are normalized powers with respect to the path loss from Alice to Bob, and with respect to the power of the background noise. So, without loss of generality, we let the power of the background noise be one.
With jamming from both Alice and Bob, the signals received by Bob and Eve are respectively:
where [A 1 , A 2 ] = [AV 1 , AV 2 ] = AV. Since A 1 and A 2 are linear functions of the Gaussian matrix A, they remain Gaussian. Because of the unitary nature of V, A 1 and A 2 are independent of each other, and all elements in them are i.i.d. Gaussian of zero mean and unit variance. The noise vectors n B and n E are distributed as CN (0, I). Also note that √ ρGw B (k) is the residual self-interference originally caused by w B (k) but is independent of w B (k) [30] . If CSI anywhere is known everywhere, the achievable secrecy rate of the above system is known [32] to be
where R AB is the rate from Alice to Bob and R AE is the rate from Alice to Eve. Namely,
where
Note that since HV 1 = U 1 Σ 1 and HV 2 = U 2 Σ 2 are orthogonal to each other where U 1 and U 2 are the partitions of U similar to those of V, and Σ 1 and Σ 2 are the corresponding diagonal partitions of Σ, a sufficient statistics of s(k) at Bob
shows that the artificial noise from Alice does not affect Bob.
Consequently, an equivalent form of R AB is
However, the expression shown in (7) is needed later due to its direct connection to H and G.
If we optimize P n , P B and Q r to maximize the above R S , the solution would be a function of Eve's CSI. This does not appear to be useful in practice.
If Eve's CSI is unknown to Alice but the statistics of Eve's CSI is known to Alice, then we can consider the ergodic secrecy:
which is achievable via coding over many CSI coherence periods. Closed form expression of each of the two terms in the above can be obtained using ideas in [33] and [34] . But if we useR S as objective to optimize P n , P B and Q r , the solution would be independent of the CSI between Alice and Bob, and such a solution is not very useful either. Because of the above reasons, we will consider the worst case of R AE . The worst case is such that Eve is located at the most harmful location and has a large number of antennas.
It is shown in our earlier work [35] that the most harmful position of Eve is at x * = −0.5 − Δ and y * = 0. From now on, we will refer to a and b as corresponding to the position (x * , y * ). In all simulations, we will use Δ = 0.1 unless mentioned otherwise.
Given a large number of antennas at Eve, we can use large matrix theory to obtain a closed-form expression of R AE that is no longer dependent on instantaneous CSI at Eve, which is shown next. We can rewrite (8) as follows:
where q r is the vector containing the diagonal elements of the diagonal matrix Q r (assuming that Alice does not know Bob's self-interference channel). Note that the J matrices consist of i.i.d. random variables and theΘ matrices are diagonal. (The numbering of 3 and 4 used here is because of the numbering later.) Lemma 1: Let J be an N × K matrix whose entries are i.i.d. complex random variables with variance 1 N , and Θ be a with its asymptotic result (the red/solid curve). diagonal deterministic matrix. Based on Theorem (2.39) of [36] ,
Here, Θ j,j is the jth diagonal element of the diagonal matrix Θ, L Θ is the number of diagonal elements of Θ, and η > 0 is the solution to the equation
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Using the lemma, it follows from (14) that for large N E ,
where for i = 3, 4,η i is the solution of η to (20) 
. Note that the right side of (20) is a monotonic function of η ≥ 0 and hence a unique solution of 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 can be easily found by bisection search.
It is useful to note that the asymptotic form R AE is a good approximation of the exact form R AE as long as N E is large regardless of N A and N B . Shown in Fig. 2 is a comparison of the exact random realizations of R AE N E from (8) with its asymp-
corresponding to 100 random realizations of Eve's CSI for each value of P A are shown. We see that as N E increases (beyond 8),
B. Power Optimization and Maximum Tolerable Number of Antennas on Eve
With (R AB − R AE ) + as the objective function, we can now develop an optimization algorithm to optimize the power distribution. Note that since the CSI required for R AB is known to Alice and Bob, we do not need to replace R AB by its asymptotic form.
Specifically, we can use this cost function g(
Then, we need to solve the following problem:
Here the optimization of r is simple, which can be done via sequential search. For a given r, the above problem is not convex. Although the constraints are convex, the cost g(x r ) is not. To see this, let us rewrite this function as follows:
The non-convex parts of g(x r ) are log |C B | and
, which are concave functions of x r . These two terms can be replaced by their upper bounds based on the first-order Taylor-series expansion around the solution of the previous iteration. Also, the dependence of g(x r ) onη 3 andη 4 can be resolved by choosing the values ofη 3 andη 4 as follows:
where t denotes the tth iteration. In other words, at iteration t, the following convex problem is solved:
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Power Optimization.
Choose proper ,η 0 3 ,η 0 4 , and set g min = 0. for r = 1 : N A do Initialize x r satisfying the constraints.
Solve (25) to get x t+1 r . Updateη 3 ,η 4 by solving (24) 
All constant terms in (23) are omitted in (26) as they do not affect the optimization.
Algorithm 1 details the proposed procedure for the power optimization. It is worth mentioning that a different optimization approach was explored in our previous work [35] , where a stochastic optimization approach was applied to the objective function R AB − E[R AE ]. These two approaches more or less give the same results, but Algorithm 1 in this paper has a significantly lower complexity. To illustrate a performance gain of the optimized powers over non-optimal powers, we will not repeat similar figures as available in [35] . But next we consider the maximum tolerable number of antennas on Eve, which can be defined in several ways. One is
which however depends on instantaneous CSI everywhere. An-
where R AB and R AE are asymptotic forms of R AB and R AE respectively. Obviously,N E is a function of x r . The third definition is
l is a value of R AB − R AE corresponding to a random realization of H and G and the corresponding optimal x r and r, and L is the total number of realizations of H and G for each N E .
To obtainN E in (28), we will let (7) becomes
Applying the lemma to (30) yields that for β 1 
where η 1 is the solution of η to (20) with β = β 1 and Θ = Θ 1 , which reduces to
and η 2 is the solution to
where and
and η 4 is the solution to . ForN E , we also chose P s = P n = P A 2 and P A = P B . We see thatN opt E is consistently larger thanN E . And the gap between the two is due to the power optimization. During simulation, we also observed that the optimal P s is often distributed approximately equally between different streams, and that if N E gets larger, the optimization favors smaller P B and smaller r (the latter of which is consistent with a result in [37] which does not use full-duplex jamming at Bob).
With the same parameters as in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 illustrates a convergence property of Algorithm 1 where the mean number of iterations needed for convergence versus N A is shown. Also shown in Fig. 4 is the 95% confidence interval of the number of iterations needed for convergence versus N A . We used 100 random realizations of the channels for each value of N A . The threshold used for convergence was chosen to be 0.01.
C. When the Number of Antennas on Eve is Very Large
We now consider the case where N E N A > N B , r = N B and Q r = P s N B I. It follows that β 3 1 and β 4 1. Hence, Fig. 4 . 95% confidence interval of the number of iterations needed for convergence of Algorithm 1 vs. N A . The dark line is the mean of the number of iterations.
(37) implies 1 − η 3 ≈ β 3 and (38) implies 1 − η 4 ≈ β 4 . Furthermore, referring to the terms in (34), we have
lim
The above equations imply that all terms, except the first, in R AE from (34) converge to zero. Therefore,
which is independent of P n and P B (and hence the optimal P n and P B are now zero). This result implies that if Eve has an unlimited number of antennas then the jamming noise from either Alice or Bob has virtually no impact on Eve's capacity to receive the information from Alice. Furthermore, we see that R AE increases without upper bound as N E increases while R AB stays independent of N E (for large N E ). (34) where N A = 2N B = 8 and P A = P B = 2P s = 2P n . We see that the two results are very close when N E > 40.
III. ANALYSIS OF ANECE
A key observation from the previous section is that if Eve knows its CSI and the number of antennas on Eve is large, then neither the artificial noise from multi-antenna Alice nor the full-duplex jamming from multi-antenna Bob can rescue Alice and Bob from being totally exposed to Eve. (This observation is an extension of a previous observation for single-antenna users shown in [30] .) To handle Eve with large number of antennas, there is a two-phase method involving anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE) proposed in [30] : in phase 1 the users conduct ANECE which allows users to obtain their CSI but denies Eve the same ability; and in phase 2 the users transmit information to each other with Eve not knowing its CSI. Both phases are within a common coherence period. While the earlier work has shown promising properties of ANECE, the understanding of ANECE is still incomplete. In this section, we show two new analyses of the secrecy rate of a two-user MIMOME network assisted by ANECE.
To simplify the problem, we do not consider the artificial noise from either Alice or Bob. The first analysis assumes a (globally known) statistical model for all CSI in the network. And the analysis is based on ideal full-duplex devices where there is no self-interference. When a result of this analysis is applied to practice, one must restrict the application to situations where the residual self-interference is negligible. Typically, the residual self-interference is proportional to the transmitted power which increases with the distance between devices. So, a situation where the residual self-interference is negligible corresponds generally to a short-range communication. The second analysis assumes that Eve does not know the statistical distribution of its CSI but rather assumes that Eve is able to perform blind detection of the information from Alice. These two analyses constitute an important new understanding of ANECE, which is not available elsewhere.
A theory where Eve knows the statistical distribution of its CSI can be applicable to situations where Eve's CSI is statistically stationary and experiences many cycles of coherence periods in a time window of interest. A theory where Eve does not know its CSI distribution can be applicable to situations where Eve's CSI is statistically un-stationary in a time window of interest. Both assumptions have their own merits.
A. Eve Uses a Statistical Model of Its CSI
Consider a block Rayleigh fading channel for which Alice and Bob first conduct ANECE by transmitting their pilot signals p A (k) and p B (k) concurrently (in full-duplex mode) where k = 1, . . . , K 1 (K 1 is the length of the pilot), and then transmit information to each other (over K 2 samples). For information transmission, we will consider a one-way transmission and a two-way transmission separately.
1) Channel Estimation:
then the corresponding signals received by Alice, Bob and Eve can be expressed as
where H is the reciprocal channel matrix between Alice and Bob, and all the noise matrices consist of i.i.d. CN (0, 1). Here, the self-interferences at Alice and Bob are assumed to be negligible. It is known and easy to show that for the best performance of the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (or the MMSE estimation as shown later) of H by Bob, P A should be such that P A P H
In the following analysis, we assume that H, A and B all consist of i.i.d. CN (0, 1) elements (from one coherence block to another). This statistical model along with the large-scale fading factors a and b is assumed to be known to everyone.
Without loss of generality, let N A ≥ N B . Without affecting the channel estimation performance at Alice and Bob, but maximizing the difficulty of channel estimation for Eve, we let the row span of P B be part of the row span of P A . More specifically, we can write
where Γ can be any K 1 × K 1 unitary matrix. In this way, any estimates of A and B by Eve, denoted byÂ andB, are ambiguous in that
vec(Y). Then (44) becomes
It is known that the minimum-mean-squared-error (MMSE) estimate of a vector x from another vector y isx = K x,y K −1 y y with K x,y = E{xy H } and K y = E{yy H }. And the error Δx = x −x has the covariance matrix K Δx = K x − K x,y K −1 y K H x,y . Letĥ A be the MMSE estimate of h by Alice, and Δh A = h −ĥ A be its error. Similar notations are defined for Bob and Eve. It is easy to show that the covariance matrices of the errors of these estimates are, respectively,
2) One-Way Information Transmission: Now assume that following the pilots (over K 1 samples) transmitted by Alice and Bob in full-duplex mode, Alice transmits information (over K 2 samples) to Bob in half-duplex mode. Namely, while the first phase is in full-duplex, the second phase is in half-duplex. In the second phase, Bob and Eve receive
The corresponding vector forms of the above are
wheres A = vec(S A ) (which is assumed to be independent of all channel parameters). Then an achievable secrecy rate in bits/s/Hz in phase 2 from Alice to Bob (conditional on the MMSE channel estimation in phase 1) is
To analyze R one , we now assume P A = P B = P (which holds for both phases 1 and 2) and that s A (k) are i.i.d. with
We will next derive lower and upper bounds on R one . To do that, we need to obtain lower and upper bounds on I(s A ; y B |ĥ B ) and those on I(s A ; y E |â).
First, we have
It is known that h(s
It is also known [38] that for a random vector s ∈ C n×1 and another random vector w, h(s|w) ≤ log[(πe) n |K s|w |] where K s|w = K s − K s,w (K w ) −1 K s,w which is the covariance matrix of the MMSE estimation of s from w. Note that y B = (I K 2 ⊗Ĥ B )s A + (I K 2 ⊗ ΔH B )s A + n B . Then conditional onĤ B (which is independent ofs A ), the covariance matrix of the MMSE estimate ofs A from y B is Ks
where r A and r B are the numbers of rows of A and B respectively, one can verify that log |Ks
Applying the above results to (49) yields
To derive an upper bound on I(s A ; y B |ĥ B ), we now write
which is a full rank matrix for any N A and K 2 and a self-
where (53a) is due to the matrix Minkowskis inequality |X + Y| 1/n ≥ |X| 1/n + |Y| 1/n where X and Y are n × n positive definite matrices [39] , (53b) is due to the Jensen's inequality and that log(1 + ae x ) is a convex function of x when a > 0, and (53c) is based on [40, Th. 1] where γ 0.57721566 is Euler's constant. Defining e A = exp( 1
1 k − γ) and applying the above results since (51), we have from (51) that
From (50) and (54) we see that the difference between the upper and lower bounds on I(s A ; y B |ĥ B ) is the second term in (54).
To consider I(s A ; y E |â) in (48), we letÂ = ivec(â). Similar to the discussions leading to (50) and (54), one can verify that
and
When
From [41, Th. 2] , we know that E{log |I r + P t XX H |} → min(r, t) log P + o(log P ) as P → ∞ where the entries of X ∈ C r×t are i.i.d . CN (0, 1) . Therefore, from (50) and (54),
And from (55) and (56), we have 
Combining (57), (58) and (59) and using R +
Note that lim P →∞ R one log P is called the secure degrees of freedom of the one-way information transmission. From (60) and (61), we see that when K 2 ≤ N A , we have lim P →∞ R one log P = min{N A , N B } which equals the degrees of freedom of the main channel capacity from Alice to Bob. This supports and complements a conclusion from [30] where the analysis did not use the complete statistical model of H, A and B. We also see from (60) that if K 2 > N A , the above lower bound on secure degrees of freedom decreases linearly as N E increases.
3) Two-Way Information Transmission: Now we consider a two-way (full-duplex) communication in the second phase where the signals received by Alice, Bob and Eve in a coherence period are
where S A = [s A (1), . . . , s A (K 2 )] and s A (t) ∼ CN (0, P A N A I).
Note that all information symbols from Alice and Bob are i.i.d. The vectorized forms of (62) are
where boths A ands B are assumed to be independent of all channel parameters. Conditional on the MMSE channel estimation in phase 1, an achievable secrecy rate in phase 2 by the two-way wiretap channel is (e.g., see [42] ):
The following analysis is similar to the previous section, for which we will only provide the key steps and results. From (50) and (54), we already know a pair of lower and upper bounds on I(s A ; y B |ĥ B ) . To show a similar pair of lower and upper bounds on I(s B ; y A |ĥ A ), we letĤ A = ivec(ĥ A ). One can verify that
Define
Then we can rewrite the last term from (67) as E{log |σ 2
where e E1 = exp( 1
The second inequality in (68) is from the fact (e.g., see [43, Th. 3] 
where e E2 = exp( 1
Therefore, using (68) and (69), we have from (67) that
One can also verify
which is the first term in (70).
. Then, similar to (57), we have
One can also verify that log P = 0,
73) Now applying (57), (71), (72) and (73), and using R + 
We see that if
log P = 2 min{N A , N B } which equals the degrees of freedom of the full-duplex channel between Alice and Bob. And if K 2 > N A + N B , the above lower bound on lim P →∞ R two log P decreases linearly as N E increases. We see an advantage of two-way information transmission over one-way information transmission.
B. Eve Uses Blind Detection With Zero Knowledge of Its CSI
Now we reconsider the case of one-way information transmission from Alice to Bob in the second phase but assume that Eve performs a blind detection of the information transmitted from Alice. For the blind detection shown next, we also assume that K 2 > N A and Eve's knowledge of its CSI matrix √ aA ∈ C N E ×K 2 is zero. (The two-way information transmission between Alice and Bob in either half-duplex or ideal full-duplex can be treated similarly. For the case of K 2 ≤ N A , Eve cannot receive any information from the users due to its unknown CSI.)
The signal received by Eve during information transmission from Alice over K 2 sampling intervals is
where the elements in S A ∈ C N A ×K 2 are assumed to be independently chosen from a known constellation S N with size N . Assume that Eve performs the blind detection as follows:
Given any S, the optimal √ aA is Y E S H (SS H ) −1 . Then, the above problem reduces to the following (an issue of uniqueness will be addressed later) 
whereŝ − s 0 is the approximation of errors in the vector of all N A (K 2 − N A ) remaining symbols and
89) Finally, for K 2 > N A , Eve's effective rate (with the information in the first N A vectors of s(k) removed) can be approximated as
whereQ is the covariance matrix of the vector of all remaining symbols.
To evaluate R
AE , one has to specify the actual constellation S N of each symbol in S, computeŝ − s 0 for each actual realization of S 0 according to (89), and then obtain a sample averaged version ofM in (88). Each of the realizations of S 0 should be coupled with an independent realization of the channel matrix A and the noise matrix N E . With the final sample-averaged versions ofQ andM, R (2) AE in (90) can be obtained. For the next two plots, we assume that S N is 4-QAM, 3 100 random realizations of S 0 , A and N E are used in computing R (2) AE . Also, during information transmission from Alice to Bob, P A = 30 dB (and P B = 0). In this case, due to high power, we expect the Taylor's series expansion applied in our derivation is accurate. Fig. 6 shows R
AE versus K 2 /N A where N A = N B = 4 and N E = 8. We see that only when K 2 becomes much larger than N A , R
AE approaches R AE . Note that R (2) AE is based on unknown CSI at Eve and blind detection at Eve while R AE is based on the assumption that Eve knows its CSI perfectly. Fig. 7 shows the averaged secret rateR S = (E[R AB − R The actually computed points were at N E = 4, 8, 16, 32.) In this case, (E[R AB − R AE ]) + is zero for all values of N E . But when Eve is blind to its CSI (caused by ANECE), the secrecy rates become substantial. In this case, we also see that for given K 2 > N A the secrecy rate decreases as the number of antennas on Eve increases.
The above results in this subsection complement the analytical insights shown in the previous subsection (e.g., see (60)). Due to different assumptions, we cannot make a precise comparison between (60) and Figs. 6 and 7 while the general trends predicted in both cases are somewhat consistent. An additional discussion of the blind detection where Eve uses a partial knowledge of its CSI from phase 1 is shown in Appendix B.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy performance of a full-duplex MIMOME network in some important scenarios. In the first part of this paper, we studied how to optimize the jamming powers from both Alice and Bob when Eve's CSI is unknown to Alice and Bob but Eve knows all CSI. To handle Eve's CSI being unknown to Alice and Bob, we focused on Eve at the most harmful location and adopted the large matrix theory that yields a hardened secret rate for any large number of antennas on Eve. With the optimized powers, we revealed a significant improvement in terms of the maximum tolerable number of antennas on Eve. In the second part of this paper, we analyzed the full-duplex MIMOME network subject to the application of anti-eavesdropping channel estimation (ANECE) in a two-phase scheme. Assuming that a statistical model of CSI anywhere is known everywhere, we derived lower and upper bounds on the secure degrees of freedom of the network, which reveal clearly how the number of antennas on Eve affect these bounds. In particular, for 1 ≤ K 2 ≤ N A in one-way information transmission or 1 ≤ K 2 ≤ N A + N B in two-way information transmission, the lower and upper bounds coincide and equal to those of the channel capacity between Alice and Bob. Furthermore, assuming that Eve does not have any prior knowledge of its CSI but uses blind detection in phase 2 of the two-phase scheme, we provided and illustrated an approximate secrecy rate for K 2 > N A in one-way information transmission. But the exact secrecy rate of the full-duplex MIMOME network with ANECE for K 2 larger than the total number of transmitting antennas still remains elusive. Nevertheless, the contributions shown in this paper are significant additions to our previous works shown in [30] and [35] , which expands the understanding of full-duplex radio for wireless network security.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The following proof is a simple digest from [36] that is useful to help readers to understand Lemma 1 more easily. The Shannon transform of the distribution of a random variable X with parameter γ is defined as
and the η−transform of the distribution of X with parameter γ is defined as
where γ ≥ 0. The empirical cumulative distribution function of the eigenvalues of an n × n random non-negative-definite Hermitian matrix A is defined as
where λ 1 (A), . . . , λ n (A) are the eigenvalues of A, and 1{.} is the indicator function. When F n A (x) converges as n → ∞, the corresponding limit is denoted by F A (x).
It is obvious that 
and if n → ∞ then
which is the Shannon transform of the eigenvalue distribution of the matrix A when n is large. The Shannon transform of the eigenvalue distribution of Θ with parameter η is obviously given by (19) . And the η-transform of the eigenvalue distribution of Θ with parameter x is obviously given by
From Theorem 2.39 in [36] , the η-transform of the eigenvalue distribution of JΘJ H with parameter γ, denoted by η here, satisfies
Applying (96) to the above equation with γ = 1 yields
which reduces to (20) . Also from Theorem 2.39 in [36] , the Shannon transform of the eigenvalue distribution of JΘJ H with parameter γ = 1 is
which is Ω(β, Θ, η) in (18) .
APPENDIX B EVE USES BLIND DETECTION WITH PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE OF ITS CSI
Now we consider the case where Eve can use its signal in phase 1 to obtain its CSI up to a subspace ambiguity, i.e., in the absence of noise, Eve can obtain from Y E as in (44c) the following:Â = A + ΘC A (100)
For convenience and without loss of generality, we assume here a = b = 1.
With one-way information transmission from Alice to Bob in phase 2, Eve can now perform a constrained blind detection as follows:
For any given S, the solution for Θ is
Then, the problem of (103) reduces to
where P C A S = (C A S) H (C A S(C A S) H ) −1 C A S. The problem of (105) is more complex than (78) due to higher order of the cost function in terms of S. A performance analysis of (105) can be done in a similar way as for (78) but is omitted.
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